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Abstract 
It is argued that the meaning of inevitability and contingency depends on the position someone has in 
the realism/constructivism debate.  Furthermore, it is argued that analyzing what we mean by inevitable 
versus contingent knowledge adds a new dimension to the realism/constructivism debate. Scientific 
realist and social constructivist views of science often lead to, respectively, too high expectations and too 
low confidence in what science can do. This controversy is not always productive for scientific practices 
that work in the context of practical applications (e.g., the engineering sciences). The aim of this paper is 
to make a contribution to a more viable view of those scientific practices. The approach taken is to 
construe two philosophical stances within which the meaning of inevitability and contingency is 
examined. The first stance is called metaphysical realism. It is construed such that it fits Hacking’s (2000) 
ideas on the inevitability of scientific knowledge. The second stance is called epistemological 
constructivism. The two stances agree that there is an independent world which sets limits to our 
knowledge, but they disagree on whether we must assume the existence of a pre-given, or even, 
knowable structure in the world. The dissonance between the two stances is reduced such that just one 
significant epistemological issue remains, namely, which part(s) of science are inevitable? Next, the 
contingency of science is interpreted in terms of Giere’s (2006) notion of scientific perspectivism. This 
view emphasizes the role of (different kinds of) instruments in providing epistemic access to the world – 
which is why we cannot attain mirror-like knowledge of the world. Both stances agree on this view. Yet, 
when considering the apparent presuppositions of perspectivism an additional epistemological issue 
arises, namely, whether a clear distinction can be made between the object and representations (i.e., 
perspectives) of that object. In order to be more faithful to concrete scientific practice, it is proposed to 
consider (different kinds of) instruments as interfaces rather than perspectives on something. In the 
epistemological constructivist stance, interfaces transform material or symbolic or electronic or 
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whatever input, which cannot be directly perceived or known by us, to output that can be perceived, 
experienced and/or conceived (e.g., numbers, tables, graphs). Finally, the materiality of (different kinds 
of) instruments is crucial for explaining which parts of science are inevitable. 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 A viable philosophical view about science 
In her introduction to the workshop Science as it could have been – Discussing the contingent/inevitable 
aspects of scientific practices, Léna Soler states that the issue of contingency versus inevitability in 
science is of great epistemological significance.  She suggests that in order to enrich the space of viable 
philosophical views about science the debate on this issue must be distinguished from the discussion on 
scientific realism. In line with this suggestion, my broader aim when addressing this issue is to ensure 
that the resulting philosophical view about science must be prolific for scientific practices, especially 
those which focus on experimental research in application contexts. 
My guiding question in developing a prolific philosophical view of science is this: If philosophers 
of science get the opportunity to teach science students, what would they tell them? My short answer is 
that philosophy of science has a role to play in explaining “what science can do and what it cannot do”. 
Science, in close collaboration with technology, has been incredibly successful. At the same time, it is an 
empirical fact as well as a philosophical insight that science does not provide certainty. Against this 
background, scientific researchers must learn to ride the waves of too high expectations and too low 
confidence in what science can do. Philosophical understanding of science should facilitate critical as 
well as creative reflection on methods of producing and testing scientific knowledge. Discussions in the 
on-going realism/constructivism debate have not always been productive in this respect. But refinement 
of this debate by accounting for the issue of contingency versus inevitability within science may 
contribute to a more viable philosophical view of science. 
 
1.2 Inevitable versus contingent aspects: “content” versus “form” 
In his seminal paper How inevitable are the results of science? Hacking (2000) has added this extra 
dimension of contingent versus inevitable aspects of science to the realism/constructionist debate in the 
philosophy of science. Soler (2008a, 222) proposes that one way to understand the contingency of 
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science is well-expressed by Steve Shapin, who wrote: “Reality seems capable of sustaining more than 
one account given of it” (Shapin, 1982, 194). Hacking acknowledges the contingency in science to the 
effect that the scientific results of a science may have a different “form” – but he rejects the 
constructionist contingency claim that no scientific result is an inevitable part of successful science: 
 “The ‘forms’ of scientific knowledge could have been different, yet still, we would be recognizably 
exploring the same aspects of nature [that is, its ‘content’].” (Hacking 2000, 71, my emphasis).  
Hacking argues that there is a significant sense in which the results of a successful science are inevitable 
(that is, non-contingent), namely, in the sense that any investigation of roughly the same subject matter, 
if successful, would at least implicitly contain or imply the same results. In this regard, his bête noire is 
the “boldest construction title in the natural science arena” of Andrew Pickering’s (1984) monograph 
Constructing quarks. Hacking uses the standard model of physics in which quarks are the building blocks 
of the universe as the basis for his argumentation; whereas Pickering’s provocative title suggests that 
quarks are constructed. Hacking analyses Pickering’s ideas by distinguishing between “objects, ideas, and 
more abstract items, arrived at by semantic ascent, such as facts, truth, and reality” and concludes that: 
“Quarks, in that crude terminology, are objects. But Pickering does not claim that quarks, the objects, are 
constructed. So, the idea of quarks, rather than quarks, might be constructed.” (ibid. 61, my emphasis)  
Below, I will argue that Hacking’s interpretation is inadequate. 
 
1.3 Distinguishing inevitability/contingency from realism/constructivism 
Although the contingency/inevitability issue is closely related to the realism/constructivism debate (e.g., 
Hacking 2000, Giere 2006), Soler (2008b), who aims at precise definitions of the inevitabilist and 
contingentist positions, argues that in order to address epistemologically significant aspects, the 
‘contingentism versus inevitabilism’ debate must be disentangled from the ‘realism versus anti-realist 
constructivism’ debate. In Section 2.1 I will review ways in which inevitability and contingency – as 
semantic notions that concern the relation between knowledge and world – have been analysed. I agree 
with Soler (2008b) that, in spite of their frequent association in the writings of philosophers, the two 
oppositions do not coincide. As I will argue, it is very well possible that a scientific realist accepts the role 
of contingency in science, whereas an anti-realist constructivist admits inevitable aspects. But, I will also 
propose that the meaning of inevitability versus contingency is framed by the position one takes in the 
realism/constructivism debate. 
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Accordingly, I will propose a matrix that frames the inevitability/contingency issue within two 
philosophical stances, which I call metaphysical realism and epistemological constructivism:  
 
 I. Metaphysical  Realism II. Epistemological Constructivism 
a. Inevitable aspects I.a II.a 
b. Contingent aspects I.b II.b 
 
My construal of these stances (in Section 2.4) will be such that they facilitate the articulation of 
significant controversies important for understanding the mentioned scientific practices. Furthermore, it 
aims to steer away from some of the unbridgeable controversies between scientific realism and social 
constructivism (also see Hacking 1999). Firstly, in my construal, both stances take account of the central 
role of an independent material world (including instruments and apparatus), and share the idea that 
this independent world sets limits to our knowledge. Secondly, as an alternative to strong social 
constructivism, the image of construction I endorse is that of constructing and utilizing structures in 
mathematics for describing patterns and performing mathematical operations (e.g., mathematical 
equations, axiomatic systems, mathematical transformations), together with the construction and 
utilization of concepts and metaphors (e.g., force, acceleration, reversibility) that enable the description 
and modelling of physical phenomena (also see Boon 2011, Rouse 2011, and Boon 2012b). 
The views on inevitability/contingency in column I. are framed by metaphysical presuppositions 
about the character of nature, such as, that nature contains or consists of fundamental building blocks 
and/or a fundamental (causal) structure (cf. Putnam 1981). Position I.a entails the belief that some 
results of science (its “content” as Hacking 2000 puts it) are inevitable. This content may be referred to 
as objects such as quarks, electrons and proteins (e.g., Hacking 2000). Other authors assume that 
structures such as the laws of nature are the inevitable results of science (e.g., as in Worrall’s 1989 
Structural Realism, but also physicists such as Glashow 1992 and Weinberg 1996). Position I.b accounts 
for the whimsicality revealed in the history of science (such as radical changes in scientific paradigms) 
through the admittance that some aspects are contingent (e.g., the “form” of scientific results, as 
suggested by Hacking). Hacking’s (2000) position is therefore covered by I.a and I.b in this framework. 
Constructivist positions may be motivated by a metaphysical presupposition claiming that there 
is no independent order or structure in the world (e.g., Cartwright 1999), or by epistemological 
presuppositions according to which the question of whether there is a pre-given order in nature cannot 
be answered in principle because we do not have epistemic access to confirm this claim (e.g., Van 
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Fraassen 1980, 2008). Pickering’s (1984) view fits with II.b, but it is hard to tell whether his 
constructivism is either metaphysically or epistemologically driven. Still, Hacking’s (2000) suggestion that 
constructing quarks means that the idea of quarks is constructed rather than the object itself, disagrees 
with the presuppositions of both metaphysical and epistemologically driven constructivism. Indeed, as I 
will argue in Section 3, the divide between knowledge about the real existence of an object versus ideas 
of the object is obvious and intelligibly for a scientific realist, but not for a constructivist. 
 
1.4 Contingency and Inevitability according to Epistemological Constructivism  
The position I aim to defend in this debate can be classified as a combination of II.a and II.b. My 
constructivist position is motivated by the epistemological presupposition that we do not have 
knowledge of the world independent of the apparatus and instruments we use. Our motor system and 
technological devices enable access to and interventions with the world, whereas our perceptual 
apparatus and cognitive faculty, together with the technological instruments needed to perform 
measurements, enable epistemic access as well as the construction of epistemic results. The way in 
which scientists construct epistemic results is both dependent on the data they have gathered by means 
of a contingent assembly of instruments, apparatus and procedures, and on contingent ways in which 
they structure data and form concepts. Important to my view is the idea that apparatus and instruments 
used in experimentally investigating the world form an inherent part of our knowledge of the world (also 
see Floridi 2011). More specifically, I will argue that we cannot get beyond them in such a way that we 
acquire non-contingent knowledge, which is knowledge that somehow reflects the inherent structure of 
the world independent of our instruments and apparatus (including our motor system, perceptual 
apparatus and cognitive faculty). 
In explaining my view of the role of instruments and apparatus, I will use Giere’s (2006) Scientific 
Perspectivism as a productive starting-point (in Section 3). Giere’s goal is to develop an understanding of 
scientific claims that mediates between the “objectivist realism” maintained by physicists such as 
Glashow and Weinberg and/or the hard realism of many philosophers of science, versus the contingency 
of science as held by social constructivists. According to Giere: 
 “[F]ull objectivist realism (‘absolute objectivism’) remains out of reach, even as an ideal. The inescapable, 
even if banal, fact is that scientific instruments and theories are human creations. We simply cannot 
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transcend our human perspective, however much some may aspire to a God’s-eye view of the universe.” 
(Giere 2006, 15, my emphasis) 
However, Giere’s scientific perspectivism draws on an epistemological picture that sometimes suggests 
the involvement of a metaphysical realist stance. In order to bring the role of “perspectives” in 
accordance with the epistemological constructivist stance, I will propose that, rather than to be 
understood as having different scientific perspectives on the world, the way in which “perspectives” 
(which encompass our perceptual apparatus, cognitive faculty, technological instrument, and theories) 
make the world epistemically accessible has the character of the workings of interfaces, which transform 
aspects of the world (the input) into perceptions and knowledge of the world (the output). 
 
2. The inevitability/contingency debate 
2.1 Contingency/inevitability disconnected from realism and constructivism 
Soler (2008b) argues that, although a connection is often made between inevitabilism and realism, and 
between contingentism and anti-realism or constructivism, it is worthwhile to define the 
contingentism/inevitabilism issue as separate from the realism/constructivism issue. Soler defines 
inevitabilism as follows: If more or less the same initial conditions exist as those in our own history of 
science, for which a successful and progressive physics has indeed been developed, then, inevitably, 
physics in this setting, at least in the long run, yields (a1) more or less the same results or (a2) different 
but reconcilable results, and (b) the same ontology as our own. Conversely, contingentism involves the 
possibility, at least in the long run, of an alternative physics, as successful and progressive as ours, which 
yields (a’) results irreducibly different from ours, and (b’) involving an ontology incompatible with ours 
(Soler 2008b, 233). Next, Soler aims to elucidate the problematic notions “different but reconcilable” and 
“irreducibly different” results or ontologies, by examining these options in thought-experiments with 
two different physics. 
Soler’s approach to articulating an “epistemologically significant controversy” makes sense, and 
the resulting definitions in which contingentism is contrasted with inevitabilism, as well as her attempt 
to elucidate how we could possibly decide between them on empirical grounds, are clarifying. 
Nevertheless, I doubt whether her suggestion about the contingentist position is correct, or at least, the 
only possible interpretation of this position. I agree that contingentists believe that: (i) their position 
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would be empirically supported if it turns out that “after a very long time” the two physics are irreducibly 
different in the sense that they are incompatible. But I doubt that contingentists assume that: (ii) this 
empirical finding thus supports the idea that two physics can be “essentially incompatible”. Indeed, Soler 
concludes that: 
“Such a contingentist position about the results of physics requires, as a precondition, the adoption of an 
inevitabilist stance (inevitably, the two physics had to remain disjoint, unreconciled, because of their very 
nature).” (Soler 2008b, 240) 
The apparent contradiction of the contingentist view expressed by Soler can be clarified within the 
previously proposed matrix. This schema says that metaphysical realism and epistemological 
constructivism are two stances within which contingent and inevitable aspects of science are interpreted 
differently. From an epistemological constructivist stance, the empirical finding that two successful 
physics are incompatible is explained epistemologically rather than metaphysically. An epistemological 
constructivist understands at a meta-level why the two physics are each sound but incompatible (e.g., in 
the sense of Kuhn’s meta-level understanding of the incommensurability of two physics in terms of 
distinct disciplinary matrices). Conversely, drawing the conclusion that they are “essentially 
incompatible,” as expressed in (ii), typically agrees to a metaphysical realist stance. Hence, Soler’s 
(2008b) suggestion that a contingentist accepts this latter conclusion is only correct for those who have 
adopted a metaphysical realist stance (e.g., position I.b in the matrix). Accordingly, in my view, 
definitions of contingentism/inevitabilism are entangled with positions in the realism/constructivism 
debate, and epistemological constructivism is a way to escape the realism/constructivism dichotomy. 
 
2.2 Empirically supported contingency 
The purpose of my contribution to the contingentism/inevitabilism debate is to reconcile two seemingly 
contradictory intuitions of inevitability and contingency, respectively: (1) that an independent world 
determines (or sets limits to) scientific knowledge, and (2) that “Reality seems capable of sustaining 
more than one account given of it.” From a scientific practice point of view, an argument in favour of the 
contingency thesis is the crucial role of constructive activities and conceptual work. Accepting this role 
involves acknowledging that scientific theories are not ‘discovered’ but ‘constructed’, yet, without 
claiming that an independent reality doesn’t have a role to play (also see Boon and Knuuttila 2009). 
Moreover, it involves the idea that inventing or developing or ‘radically changing’ scientific concepts is 
 8 
 
essential to the construction of theories while, subsequently, these concepts are an ineliminable part of 
the final epistemic result, rather than being mere heuristic means that enabled the discovery but 
subsequently can be eliminated from the central core of the theory (also see Boon 2012b). 
 The contingentist thesis also finds empirical support in the history of science (e.g., Pickering 
1984; Cushing 1994), and I assume that in this very sense it is unproblematic for those inevitabilists, who, 
like Hacking (2000), admit the role of contingency. The central issue of the contingency/inevitability 
debate relevant for a viable view of science is then, whether at least some parts of the content of 
scientific claims are inevitable? Hacking (2000), who raised this issue, puts it this way: 
“If the results R of a scientific investigation are correct, would any investigation of roughly the same 
subject matter, if successful, at least implicitly contain or imply the same results?” (ibid. 70-71) 
Hacking’s inevitabilist position consists in an affirmative answer to this question, whereas an 
epistemological constructivist will object that this would very much depend on the conceptual 
framework adopted in the investigation.  
 
2.3 Inevitability: existence and knowability 
Hacking’s (2000) inevitabilism seems to be at odds with his contingentist position in The self-vindication 
of the laboratory sciences (Hacking 1992; also see Trizio 2008, footnote 19), which can be summarized by 
the following quotes: 
“It is my thesis that as a laboratory science matures, it develops a body of types of theory and types of 
apparatus and types of analysis that are mutually adjusted to each other. They become (...) ‘a closed 
system’ that is essentially irrefutable. They are self-vindicating in the sense that any test of theory is 
against apparatus that evolved in conjunction with it. (…) The present picture suggests that there are many 
different ways in which a laboratory science could have stabilized. The resultant stable theories would not 
be parts of the one great truth, not even if they were prompted by something like the same initial 
concerns, needs, curiosity. Such imaginary stable sciences would not even be comparable, because they 
would be true to different and quite literally incommensurable classes of phenomena and instrumentation. 
(…) Our preserved theories and the world fit together so snugly less because we have found out how the 
world is than because we have tailored each to the other.” (Hacking 1992, 30-31, my emphasis) 
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Trizio (2008) concludes that Hacking (2000) seems to have become less enthusiastic about his own 
contingentism. Indeed, the epistemological constructivist interpretation of contingency and inevitability I 
propose in this article, for the most part agrees with, and has been inspired by Hacking (1992), which 
suggests a serious incoherency in Hacking’s (2000) ideas. It must be kept in mind, however, that Hacking 
calls himself a materialist. His inevitabilism concerns the materially existing entities and phenomena, 
which he thinks of as identifiable and/or recognizable “aspects of nature” that exist independent of us, 
and which he refers to as the “content” of scientific knowledge. The way in which I understand Hacking’s 
(2000) position regarding inevitabilism, is that once scientists have adopted certain questions as relevant 
and thus opened up a specific scientific field – for instance, questions about fundamental matter, or 
questions about the material functioning of human bodies – they will (at least, if they are successful and 
don’t make mistakes) inevitably find the entities that are relevant to those questions, very similar to the 
inevitability of discovering America once discoverers leave port to chart the world, simply because these 
objects are out there in the world. This situation of ‘how the world is’ warrants that answers to questions 
about the natural world have nothing to do with us, as Hacking (2000) puts it. Additionally, if we can 
intervene with the theoretical entities represented in theories, we know that these entities exist (Hacking 
1983). 
Hacking’s (2000) inevitabilism/contingentism involves a metaphysical realist stance as it 
presupposes (1) the existence of an independent material structure in the world that is knowable to us, 
and (2) that the content of this knowledge is inevitably true, whereas the form in which it is represented 
is contingent and does not qualify as having truth-content. Although Hacking’s position is attractive since 
it reconciles plausible aspects of both contingency and inevitability, I am critical about the two 
presuppositions. 
My critique of the first presupposition agrees with Trizio (2008, 254) who criticizes the 
suggestion that discoveries of theoretical entities and phenomena are similar to geographical 
discoveries. Geographical discoveries are inevitable because there simply is no alternative history: “all 
conceivable alternatives lead either to the same discovery, or to no discovery at all.” Regarding the 
‘discovery’ of theoretical entities and phenomena Trizio builds on the ideas of Hacking (1992): 
“Phenomena are not out there, ready for us to discover and describe, for what we call phenomena are 
actually complex patterns of results that emerge in a process of stabilization of a certain branch of 
laboratory science.” (Trizio 2008, 257) 
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Given the epistemological constructivist stance I endorse (and which I will explain in more detail), my 
difficulty with the second assumption is how we can conceive of the ‘non-contingent’ part of knowledge? 
On a more rigorous take, the non-contingent part of knowledge is the knowledge that remains after 
liberating it from all conceptual content (i.e., its “form”). Yet, how could knowledge liberated from its 
conceptual content (i.e., its contingent part) tell us anything about the world? 
 
2.4 Two philosophical stances 
A viable picture of science must counter contra-intuitive consequences of strong forms of social 
constructivism as well as the philosophical puzzles that arise from naive forms of scientific realism. This is 
why the distinction between inevitability and contingency of scientific knowledge may be productive. As 
was discussed above, Soler (2008a and b) proposed to disentangle the definition of the 
inevitability/contingency issue from the realism/constructivism debate. Whereas the latter is primarily 
philosophical, her approach to the former is also empirical (including historical analyses and thought 
experiments). It turns out, however, that drawing conclusions from possible empirical outcomes involves 
a philosophical stance. Against this background, I propose to analyse the issue within two distinct 
stances: metaphysical realism and epistemological constructivism (see the matrix in Section 1.3). The two 
stances are constructed such that the first agrees to the kind of metaphysical realist position I attributed 
to Hacking (in the section above), whereas the second presents my own epistemological constructivism. 
According to my construal, the two stances share the conviction that some aspects of science are 
inevitable/contingent, but disagree on what those aspects are. Furthermore, the philosophical 
presuppositions of each stance seem to play a crucial role in explaining why those aspects are 
inevitable/contingent. They also share the idea that the contingency of scientific knowledge – in the 
sense that “Reality seems capable of sustaining more than one account given of it” – can be explained in 
part by the under-determination of theories by empirical data and contingent metaphors and concepts 
in terms of which empirical findings are interpreted. Additionally, both agree on the existence of an 
independent world that puts constraints on our knowledge. Yet, they disagree as to whether we can 
know that the independent world has a well-ordered ‘inherent’ (material or causal or abstract) structure 
(also referred to as “intrinsic nature”). What is more, as has been discussed in Section 2.1, they disagree 
on why different accounts of reality are incompatible. 
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In relation to the latter, metaphysical realists deny incompatibility regarding the inevitable, true 
part of scientific knowledge, which they believe refers to the independently existing objects or structure 
of the world. Our representations thereof may be incompatible, but this does not change the object or 
structure. What they may have in mind, metaphorically, is that we can point at them (and/or intervene 
with them, as Hacking 1983 puts it) in a similar way to how we point at observable things and give them 
names such as ‘apple’, ‘America’, ‘protein’ and ‘electron’, as well as gather knowledge about their 
properties and behaviour. This latter epistemic activity does not change what ‘the thing itself’ is. Hence, 
according to this picture, the inevitable, non-contingent part of our knowledge ties up with the 
independently existing thing we point at, whereas our representations of it are contingent. The 
contingency of our representations of things is due to the contingency of what we pick-out when 
describing them, and to the contingent metaphors and concepts scientists employ. 
Although, as I will show in Section 3, Giere’s (2006) scientific perspectivism agrees in many 
respects to the epistemological constructivist stance, his metaphor of mapmaking can be used as an 
illustration of the picture of the metaphysical realist stance regarding the epistemological distinction 
between the object under study that we can point at, and our knowledge of it. By presenting mapmaking 
as a metaphor of modelling the world, Giere aims to explain the incompatibility of knowledge in terms of 
the incompatibility of distinct representations of a thing (e.g., the Earth) due to the distinct perspectives 
we have of it. In mapping the three-dimensional surface of the Earth onto a flat surface: 
“Every projection gives a different perspective on the Earth’s surface. But these projections are all 
incompatible. They cannot, for example, simultaneously preserve shapes and areas everywhere.” (Giere 
2006, 80) 
Clearly, these incompatible, contingent maps do not coincide with what the Earth inevitably is, let alone 
that the mapmaker constructs the Earth. In line with Hacking’s (2000, S61) phrasing, the mapmaker 
constructs ideas of the Earth, rather than the Earth. In the eyes of a metaphysical realist, this metaphor 
clarifies how a distinction between the inevitable (non-contingent) true “content” and the contingent 
“form” of scientific knowledge can be understood. 
By using this metaphor, Giere implicitly suggests that the possibility of distinguishing between 
the observable things we can point at (e.g., the Earth) and our contingent, sometimes incompatible 
representations of its features (e.g., maps) also applies to unobservable objects in science, which makes 
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the way in which he explains the incompatibility of different accounts of reality acceptable for a 
metaphysical realist. 
Conversely, the epistemological constructivist disagrees with the epistemological distinction 
between access to and knowledge of (the existence of) unobservable things, on the one hand, and 
representations of their features, on the other – which is why the notion of inevitable, non-contingent, 
true “content” of scientific knowledge is incomprehensible within this stance. Denying that this 
epistemological distinction can be maintained in the domain of science, in my view, is the point of Van 
Fraassen’s (1980) much disputed distinction between knowledge claims about observable and non-
observable things, and his claim that the attribution of truth only makes sense for claims about 
observable things, whereas knowledge claims about non-observable things are empirically adequate at 
most (also see, Van Fraassen 2008, and Boon 2012a). The epistemological constructivist accepts the 
incompatibility of different accounts of reality ‘all the way down’, and explains it in terms of, e.g., 
different paradigms or perspectives within which scientific knowledge must be constructed. 
In conclusion, the question of whether ‘non-contingent knowledge’ is an epistemologically 
meaningful notion with regard to scientific knowledge boils down to an epistemological issue, namely, 
whether the distinction can be maintained between knowledge of (the existence of) a thing (e.g., a 
theoretical entity or structure or law) and its representations. I do not believe that this issue can be 
decisively solved. In a metaphysical realist stance, the belief that this distinction is meaningful will be 
supported by both the metaphysical presupposition that the world has a well-defined structure, which 
goes smoothly together with the view that scientific research has the character of discovering what there 
already is, similar to expeditions which discover what there is by exploring the world (and/or by 
intervening with the independently existing material objects, as Hacking 1983 suggests). My 
epistemological constructivist stance draws on another picture, which better suits the experiences of 
scientific researchers in chemistry and engineering. From this viewpoint, the amount of empirical 
information that can be gathered about the world is infinite and therefore requires scientists to impose 
different kinds of structures for organising, representing and interpreting this information (also see 
Massimi 2008). What is more, scientists usually aim to develop experimental set-ups and technological 
procedures such that they obtain manageable, well-ordered and reproducible information. On this 
matter I have in mind Cartwright’s (1999) notion of nomological machines (see Section 4.2). 
Furthermore, the role of instruments and apparatus developed and employed for gathering this 
information should not be understood, metaphorically, as seeing the world through some kind of 
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magnifying glass. In many cases we do not have independent access to what there is ‘behind’ or ‘in’ the 
instrument or apparatus. Often, we cannot clearly distinguish between ‘world’ (i.e., the purported 
phenomenon or the object under study) and the instruments used in our explorations (also see Harré’s 
2003 notion of apparatus-world complex, and Boon 2004). In these cases, the epistemological distinction 
between knowledge of (the existence of) purported entities and representations of them cannot be 
maintained. Epistemological constructivism is a direct consequence of this, in the sense that, if we 
cannot hold anymore a sharp distinction between the entities and their representation, then both 
constructivism and realism are unable to grasp the complex relation between knowledge and reality. 
Which instead is what epistemological constructivism is supposed to do. 
 
3. Observing the world: perspectives and interfaces 
3.1 Scientific Perspectivism as a viable alternative? 
When adopting scientific perspectivism (Giere 2006), the concern is whether at least some knowledge of 
the world ‘behind our perspectives’ is possible. Is some kind of ‘direct’ knowledge possible, or must our 
knowledge be considered perspectival ‘all the way down’? The two ideas are sketched in the following 
schema. 
  
The divide between the two stances already concerns the character of empirical knowledge. In a 
metaphysical realist stance our starting point in the production of empirical knowledge is some kind of 
direct or immediate knowledge of the independently existing object or phenomenon we point at or 
intervene with (e.g., an apple, the Earth, the brain, the Universe). Next, we acquire empirical knowledge 
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of this thing through different perspectives. This view is more or less forced upon us through our 
common language: We say that we have “a representation of X,” or “a perspective on X,” which implies a 
clear epistemological distinction between our representations of the thing called X and our ‘direct’ 
knowledge of it. This idea can also be illustrated by Giere’s descriptions of how images of the brain (i.e., 
representations of object X and its features) are produced by means of instruments such as CAT, PET or 
MRI (i.e., the perspectives), and the images of objects in the universe by means of optical or gamma ray 
telescopes. In both these cases computer programs do a lot of work in processing the data. These images 
do not simply present images of the brain, or of objects in the universe. Instead, according to Giere, one 
has images of the brain as produced by the process of computer-assisted tomography (CAT), or, as 
produced by MRI, and so forth. This character is what makes them perspectival. 
In an epistemological constructivist stance, the direction of empirical knowledge production is 
the other way round. Knowledge of (unobservable) objects and their features is considered to be already 
perspectival. Such perspectival knowledge results from an interaction between the external world and 
our perceptual apparatus and cognitive faculty. In the Kantian tradition, the ontology exemplified in 
perspectival knowledge and in the language that expresses empirical knowledge (e.g., that there are 
objects with properties, and causal relations and interactions between things or events), is regarded as 
resulting from the role of so-called regulative principles (also see Chang 2009, who calls them ontological 
principles).  
Against this background, the significant controversy between metaphysical realism and 
epistemological constructivism is whether we believe either that: (1) there exists a ‘pre-given’ ontology 
(the furniture of the world consisting of, e.g., definite material objects with definite properties, and/or 
causal structures, etc.), which can be known in a way that is independent of how humans structure and 
interpret ‘information’, and which is knowable because our perspectival knowledge is somehow similar 
to it; or (2) the ontology (the furniture of the world) we ‘point at’ or ‘refer to’ or ‘represent’, and which 
consists of, e.g., definite material objects with definite properties, and/or causal structures, etc., results 
from an interaction between the external world and our perceptual apparatus and cognitive faculty and, 
in many cases, scientific apparatus and instruments. In accordance with the belief expressed by (1), a 
metaphysical realist defends that the ‘content’ (rather than the ‘form’) of our representations of the 
‘pre-given,’ knowable ontology is inevitable. The constructivist disagrees on epistemological grounds that 
we could decide whether there is a pre-given ontology, let alone that it is knowable. Based on (2), he 
may turn the issue into the question whether the interaction between the apparatus and the 
independent material world could be the locus of inevitability. 
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3.2 How inevitable are the results of science? Or, could science have been different? 
According to Giere (2006, 88), “Wholesale scepticism about the existence of so-called theoretical entities 
now seems to me almost quixotic.” He agrees with the physicist Steven Weinberg, who states that: 
“[I]t is true that natural selection was working during the time of Lamarck, and the atom did exist in the 
days of Mach, and fast electrons behaved according to the laws of relativity even before Einstein.” 
(Weinberg 2001, 120) 
This belief of the inevitabilist, which also seems to be held by Hacking (2000), is supported by the 
metaphysical realist idea of an independently existing, inherent and knowable structure in the world. 
Does an epistemological constructivist believe that atoms did not exist in the days of Mach? And does he 
believe today that they exist? Hacking (2000), argues that a constructivist such as Pickering actually 
believes that the idea of the theoretical entities is constructed, but not the entity. In Section 1.3, I 
suggested that this divide between knowledge of the real existence of an object versus the idea of the 
object is intelligible for a scientific realist, but not for a constructivist. The epistemological constructivist 
does not build his view of science on the presupposition of an inherent and knowable structure. Instead, 
in his view, theoretical entities (and laws of nature) have been epistemologically and ontologically 
‘carved-out’ through the interaction between the independent world and our perspectives. In addition, 
some theoretical entities such as atoms also have been ‘carved-out’ through the interaction between the 
independent world and technological instruments to such an extent that we can intervene with them. 
Hence, rather than claiming that the object is constructed, the picture of the constructivist is that the 
theoretical entity is ‘carved-out,’ both materially and epistemologically.  
Metaphorically, we can think of how the sculptor carves-out a statue. Regardless of our stance, 
most of us will agree that the statue exists, and deny that the statue already existed as an inherent, 
material and knowable structure in the marble. Also most of us agree that the piece of marble (in an 
interaction with the sculptor and the techniques he has at his disposal) sets limits to the statue that can 
be carved. What is meant by ‘carving-out’ theoretical entities can also be metaphorically understood by 
the example of constructing a route on a map. The independent world (and the map) sets limits to the 
route that can be ‘carved-out’, but does not determine it. Nevertheless, the route exists as an 
independent entity as soon as it has been constructed. The metaphysical realist may reply that, in some 
cases, there will be only one possible route, and this is where our knowledge is determined by the world 
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independent of us, hence, inevitable. The epistemological constructivist responds that the case is 
mistaken because there are many possible routes, but only this one happens to be practical given our 
criteria and needs. Therefore, he will claim that “reality seems capable of sustaining more than one 
account given of it” and “we are never allowed to claim that such and such scientific achievement could 
not have been otherwise and was inevitable because of the intrinsic nature of the world.” 
 
4. A viable view of science for scientific practices 
 
4.1 Interfaces 
We cannot attain mirror-like knowledge of the inherent structure of the world. Moreover, knowledge is 
contingent because the perceptual apparatus and cognitive faculty are human, and technological and 
scientific instruments are produced by humans. Furthermore, we only have limited instruments at our 
disposal (perceptive, cognitive, measurement and theories), and thus a limited number of perspectives 
and a limited amount of information. Yet, this is not to say that every aspect of science is contingent. 
Scientific perspectivism is extremely useful for developing a viable view of scientific practices. It 
presents us with a fruitful metaphor for understanding the similarity between the functional roles of the 
perceptual apparatus, cognitive faculty and technological instruments as well as theories for the 
production of ‘pictures of the world’ (or, as Boon and Knuuttila 2009, and Boon 2012b call it, “epistemic 
tools”). I suggest that pointing-out the roles of apparatus and instruments in science, (implicitly) makes 
use of our common-sense understanding of the functioning and causal workings of machines, thus 
avoiding philosophically problematic notions of ‘world’, ‘mind’, (or, mind-independent world, and world-
independent mind) and especially, of how the interaction between these fundamentally different 
substances can be understood such that it makes intelligible how the mind gathers knowledge of the 
world. This “perspectival and instrumental” account of perception, cognition and measurement makes 
use of our common sense understanding of materiality. Materiality is ‘solid’, and is capable of exerting 
robust, stable and reproducible causal processes. These characteristics of materiality (robust, stable, 
causal), also apply to our perceptual apparatus and cognitive faculty, and to scientific instruments, as 
they are supposed to perform robust, stable and reproducible (causal) operations, thus transforming 
some kind of ‘input’ into perception and cognition of data, images, properties, processes etc..  
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 As an additional metaphor for furthering the fruitfulness of this notion, I propose that scientific 
perspectives function as interfaces (e.g., as it is used in computer technology). An interface robustly, 
stably and reproducibly transforms input of one sort into output of another sort. This metaphor may add 
to the machine metaphor in the sense that it makes the mind-world interaction more intelligible. The 
interface transforms something that is not colour at all, to colour on a screen or colour perception. It 
transforms one substance into another substance. Material or symbolic or electronic or whatever input, 
which cannot be directly perceived by us, is transformed to output that can be perceived, experienced 
and/or conceived (e.g., numbers, tables, graphs, a picture or text on a screen, a melody, a substance; and 
also, numerous physical properties such as scent, colour, heat, fluidity, solidity, elasticity; as well as 
physical processes such as coloration, heating, breaking, flowing, solidifying, evaporating and mixing). 
Conversely, an interface can transform something that can be perceived by us into something 
unperceivable (that subsequently can be processed further by, e.g., computer programs or technological 
instruments). 
Similar to our perceptual apparatus, cognitive faculties and scientific instruments that function 
as interfaces between us and the independent world, theories (e.g., the abstract principles of Newton’s 
theory of motion) function as interfaces that enable us (e.g., someone like Newton) to transform 
observations and/or measured data of parts of the world into Newtonian models of those parts of the 
world, producing, for instance, the theoretical model of the moon orbiting around the earth, or the 
theoretical model of the harmonically oscillating spring or pendulum. Similarly, scientists use theoretical 
knowledge of unobservable properties or phenomena for transforming measured data into a picture or 
model of ‘underlying’ processes. In this case, observable input (data) is transformed into pictures or 
models of aspects of the world that are not observable in any direct manner. 
Regarding the independent world, instruments etc. that are considered to be interfaces, 
transform ‘inaccessible’, ‘meaningless’ input into ‘accessible’, ‘meaningful’ output through supposed 
stable causal interactions with aspects of the independent world (often in conjunction with stable data-
processing, which indeed involves theoretical presuppositions). We commonly believe that the stability 
of these transformations is warranted by the materiality of instruments, which is the sense in which 
these transformations are non-contingent. At the same time, an epistemological constructivist believes 
that these instruments etc. do not provide us with inevitable knowledge of the independent world, 
because, metaphorically speaking, the input remains without meaning. In other words, in spite of the 
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many different scientific instruments and procedures we have developed for examining the world, we do 
not acquire knowledge of the world ‘behind the interface’. 
 
4.2 Nomological machines 
The epistemological constructivist stance proposed here involves the idea that by means of different 
kinds of instruments, scientists ontologically, epistemologically and technologically ‘carve-out’ aspects of 
the independent world, simultaneously generating reproducible physical phenomena (or, ‘regular 
behaviour’) as well as meaning and structure. Accordingly, descriptions of theoretical entities, properties 
and/or laws of nature are not taken as representations of the inherent nature or structure of the world. 
An account of how entities, properties and/or ‘laws of nature’ are ‘carved-out’ may be clarified 
somewhat further by Nancy Cartwright’s (1983, 1999) notion of nomological machines. When 
introducing this notion she writes:  
“[I will reject the story that] laws of nature are basic (...) Sometimes the arrangement of the components 
and the setting are appropriate for a law to occur naturally (e.g. the planetary system), [but usually] it 
takes what I call a nomological machine to get a law of nature. (...) [Here] a law of nature is a necessary 
regular association between properties (...) [The kind of associations chosen] tend to be just the cases 
where we understand the arrangement of capacities that give rise to them. (...)  Laws hold only ceteris 
paribus – they hold only relative to the successful repeated operation of a nomological machine. A 
nomological machine is a fixed arrangement of components, or factors, with stable capacities that in the 
right sort of stable environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular behaviour 
that we represent in our scientific laws.” Cartwright (1999, 49-50) 
As Cartwright has argued time and again, there is little regularity in our world. Regularity really only 
exists in machines, and in the laboratory. Finding regularities often requires creating “nomological 
machines” – devices that produce robust, reproducible physical behaviour. Cartwright stresses the 
crucial role of “shielding”, which means that guided by their knowledge of conditions that “disturb” the 
effect they aim at, scientists build the machine such that it shields against “disturbing” conditions. As a 
consequence of such approaches, the law-like behaviour of nomological machines should not be 
interpreted wrongly by inferring from the regularity it brings about to laws (and/or entities and 
properties) that operate independently in nature. The machine and the procedure of running it, is part of 
the condition that produces the regularity. Nevertheless, the system that has been constructed (i.e., the 
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nomological machine) operates independent of us, and the knowledge that scientists have achieved 
about relevant conditions and effects of that system, is true about aspects of that system. 
In scientific practices, it is important to understand how ‘laws of nature,’ or even, mere 
‘empirical knowledge’ is produced, that is, to recognize the indispensable role of instruments in the 
production of this knowledge. Such an understanding enables scientists to see why and how available 
scientific knowledge is applicable for the modelling of specific target systems, and/or how to make 
predictions about their behaviour. At the same time, it makes them cautious with regard to the kind of 
certainty the application of, e.g., a law of nature provides. Often their application is empirically 
successful as a result of ‘how the target system is, independent of us,’ but often it also turns out that 
predictions based on ‘laws of nature’ are incorrect. In brief, in the case of failure, scientists understand 
that, most likely, “the nomological machine” by means of which the law has been produced was 
“shielded” against conditions that happen to be relevant for the target system at hand. 
 Cartwright’s notion of nomological machines, therefore, illustrates why scientific knowledge 
resulting from experimentation is both contingent and inevitable. Expanding on Giere’s scientific 
perspectivism, a similar functional role in the production of scientific knowledge can be attributed to our 
perceptual apparatus, our cognitive faculty and our theories. 
 
4.3 Properties and interfaces 
Inevitabilists such as Hacking consider theoretical entities as part of the furniture of the world. They 
believe that theoretical entities such as proteins, electrons and quarks exist independent of us, and make 
up the ontological structure of the world. Taking into consideration several of the ideas introduced in 
this paper (i.e., scientific perspectivism, interfaces, nomological machines), we may wonder what role 
the properties of these entities have in this ontology. Firstly, theoretical entities are usually ‘discovered’ 
(in the view of inevitabilists and/or metaphysical realists) or (in the view of epistemological 
constructivists) ‘ontologically, epistemologically and technologically carved-out’, by means of their 
purported causal behaviour – that is, by means of the properties or capacities they ‘exert’ (also see 
Cartwright 1989). Secondly, as Giere (1996) claimed, properties such as colours do not actually exist in 
external objects – rather, colour is the result of an interaction between aspects of the world (e.g., 
physical light in the environment) and the human visual system. More generally, our experience and 
knowledge of properties result from interactions between a ‘target system’ (e.g., aspects of a specific 
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substance or material, and/or aspects of an experimental set-up) and measuring instruments in 
conjunction with other aspects such as human perception and cognition, theories, and technological and 
mathematical procedures. Furthermore, ever more instruments and technological procedures have been 
developed by means of which all kinds of properties of a target system are measured. We only have to 
take a look at the famous Handbook of Chemistry and Physics to acknowledge how many properties of 
materials have been established. For example, S (a substance, material or object) has a melting point, a 
specific density, a viscosity coefficient, an elasticity coefficient, a thermal and electrical conductivity 
coefficient, a diffusion coefficient, a hydrophobicity coefficient, a coefficient of surface-tension, a friction 
coefficient, a thermal expansion coefficient, an elasticity coefficient, a specific heat coefficient, an 
absorption coefficient, an atomic number or weight, a wave-length, magnetic permeability, magnetic 
and electrical field strength, a magnetic flux density, a magnetic moment, a crystallinity index, a 
refractivity index, a reflexivity coefficient, chemical concentration, potential and affinity, and solubility. 
Every physicist knows that the manifestation of these properties often is dependent on the technological 
procedure for measuring them. The colour of gold, for instance, happens to be red at the nanoscale. The 
description of such properties usually has the character of an operational definition, which means that it 
encompasses aspects of the measuring instrument and procedure (also see Boon 2012b).  
This is another insight that I find significant in teaching science students. The measuring 
instrument usually is not some kind of magnifying glass that makes the (properties of) S perceivable 
without somehow interacting with S. Instead, the technological procedures by means of which these 
physical properties manifest must be understood as interfaces. Hence, following up on Giere, we do not 
have ‘images’ of (the properties of) S, but instead, ‘images’ (e.g., the measured data pattern) of a 
property of S as produced by the interaction between (aspects of) the target system under study, on the 
one hand, and (aspects of) the instrument on the other. In other words, ‘carving-out’ a property involves 
a nomological machine, and the way in which the nomological machine provides access to aspects of the 
world is understood as the working of an interface. This understanding makes it hard to maintain that 
physical properties belong to the inherent structure of the world. At the same time, we believe that the 
manifestations we detect result from material workings, that is, from a causal interaction between an 
aspect of the independent material world and the measuring instrument. Hence, although the 
instrument may be contingent, we believe that once it is in place, its results are inevitable (also see 
Hacking 1992). 
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4.4 An overview of contingency and inevitability according to epistemological constructivism  
In this article, I have analysed the meaning of contingency/inevitability from the point of view of two 
different philosophical stances. Furthermore, I have aimed to develop a constructivist view of scientific 
practice that nevertheless takes a position as to which parts must be taken as inevitable in order to allow 
for a viable view of scientific practices that work in application contexts. Ideas about contingent and 
inevitable aspects of science within the proposed epistemological constructivist stance are summarized 
in column II of the matrix below, while column I summarizes my interpretation of Hacking’s (2000) 
position. 
It has been argued that the inevitable content of our knowledge is determined by a stable 
interaction between instruments and apparatus that enable access to, and/or interventions with the 
independent world. This idea is different from Hacking (2000), who seems to assume that the “content” 
of our knowledge is determined by the independent world only. Even so, the apparatus and instruments 
(including our motor system, perceptual apparatus and cognitive faculty) and the constellations in which 
they are used, are still contingent in the manners explained by Hacking (2000).  
Saying that the results of science are contingent due to the contribution of these contingent 
aspects does not mean to say that they are arbitrary. In constructing scientific results, the role of general 
epistemic criteria such as logical consistency, coherence with relevant accepted knowledge, 
reproducibility, and empirical adequacy is an inevitable aspect of scientific practices. However, the way 
in which these criteria are employed is not through a deterministic procedure, and not in that sense 
inevitable. Nevertheless, although their role is inevitable, it may be disputed which epistemic criteria are 
regarded as inevitable. In my view, well-known epistemic criteria such as simplicity and generality do not 
belong to this list. Scientific practices that work in application contexts, often aim at reliability and 
preciseness rather than generality and simplicity (also see Boon, 2012a). 
Different to what a constructivist position suggests, I have argued that, in order to account for 
the possibility of constructing scientific knowledge, next to the inevitable role of epistemic criteria, some 
additional presuppositions in science must be considered inevitable. Yet, these presuppositions are not 
inevitable in a metaphysical sense – neither are they inevitable in a logical sense, since their negation 
does not imply a contradiction. Instead, these inevitable presuppositions are epistemological in 
character. Kant called them regulative principles. One such principle is that we must presuppose an 
independent (physical) world that sets limits to our knowledge of it. This presupposition is regulative in 
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the sense that scientists, in order to construct knowledge of the world, must investigate the world and 
take into account the possibilities it provides and the limits it sets. At the same time, constructing 
knowledge of the external world involves some autonomy of the scientist resulting to the contingency of 
knowledge. Another regulative principle is the presupposition that the physical world is stable in the 
sense that the same physical conditions will produce the same physical effects. Again, this is not first and 
foremost a metaphysical belief about ‘how the world is’, but a principle without which the production of 
scientific knowledge would not be possible. This principle ‘regulates’ how scientists develop stable, 
robust and reproducible instruments and procedures (i.e., nomological machines), and why they believe 
that the outcome of a causal interaction between an instrument and a target-system is inevitable. 
 I. Metaphysical Realism: Metaphysics as a 
starting point for explaining science. 
II. Epistemological Constructivism: Epistemology 
as a starting point for explaining scientific practice. 
a. a. 
Inevitable 
aspects 
Metaphysical presuppositions about ‘how the 
world is.’ 
 The inevitable content of our knowledge 
is determined by the objects, properties, 
physical phenomena, laws of nature, …, 
that exist independent of us. 
Regulative principles of scientific research: 
 There exists an external (physical) world 
independent of us. 
 The world is stable in the sense that the same 
conditions will produce the same effects. 
 The inevitable content of our knowledge is 
determined by an interaction between (1) 
apparatus and instruments that enable access 
to the world, and (2) the world. 
Inevitable epistemic criteria: 
 Logical consistency; coherence with relevant 
accepted knowledge; reproducibility; and 
empirical adequacy. 
b. b. 
Contingent 
aspects 
Knowledge 
 Concepts or ‘forms’ representing these 
objects etc. 
Means 
 Instruments that measure or isolate or 
bring about phenomena. 
Knowledge 
 Concepts representing these objects etc., and 
methods of structuring and interpreting ‘data.’ 
Means 
 Instruments that measure or isolate or bring 
about phenomena. 
 Interfaces that make the world accessible for 
us. 
Epistemic criteria related to ‘epistemic purpose’: 
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 e.g., simplicity, generality, preciseness, 
reliability, efficiency. 
 
In conclusion, from an epistemological constructivist stance ‘inevitable knowledge that reflects the 
inherent structure of the world’ is a problematic notion. Nevertheless, in this manner, one arrives at 
discussing metaphysical issues, but via epistemology, rather than the other way round: Some aspects of 
science are held to be inevitable: Firstly, the notion that ‘the physical world is independent of us’, which 
involves that we presuppose an independent world that sets limits to our knowledge; secondly, the 
notion that ‘the physical world and technological instruments are material’, which involves that their 
physical functioning is independent of us, and which implies their stable and robust workings; and 
thirdly, the indispensable roles of epistemic criteria and regulative principles, which are ‘inevitable’ for 
the possibility of doing science anyway, and which are formed by the possibilities and limits of the 
human cognitive system as well as the possibilities and limits we experience of the independent world. 
Therefore, the epistemological constructivist has a different understanding of inevitability in science than 
the metaphysical realist. Accordingly, regarding the discussion in Section 2.1, an epistemological 
constructivist admits that it may very well be the case, as Hacking (2000) argues, that any investigation of 
roughly the same subject matter, if successful, would at least implicitly contain or imply the same results 
(see Section 1.2), and that physics, at least in the long run, yields (a1) more or less the same results or 
(a2) different but reconcilable results, and (b) the same ontology as our own (Soler 2008b, 233, see 
Section 2.1). However, the way in which an epistemological constructivist would explain this situation is 
in terms of a different notion of inevitability. 
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